They asked to unlock his phone, he entered the wipe instead personal pin, and the wipe starts, with no possible reversal.
I mean yeah they discover it when he hands them the phone and it shows something other than an unlocked screen… But he is still in detention? Making a fake homescreen will fool them for like 30 secs tops until they open literally any app and sees it’s either completely empty or that it doesn’t work.
What would that solve? It just drags out the procedure
The purpose of a duress code is plausible deniability.
There is an encryption product for Windows called VeraCrypt (aka TrueCrypt). You can create a hidden decoy volume inside an outer encrypted volume which has all your stuff in it. When mounted an observer cannot tell the difference between the hidden volume and the real volume since they are mounted the same way with different passcodes. You can put files in the decoy for plausibility but not the things you actually want to hide.
The same should be true of a duress code in a phone. It should be possible to put files, apps and stuff in the decoy that show activity e.g. email, pictures etc. Providing the other profile is wiped while this screen is showing then there is no immediate way of proving it was a duress code.
It would have to at least convince the border guard, but it should withstand forensic analysis too. So it might be necessary to do what VeraCrypt does.
They asked to unlock his phone, he entered the wipe instead personal pin, and the wipe starts, with no possible reversal.
I mean yeah they discover it when he hands them the phone and it shows something other than an unlocked screen… But he is still in detention? Making a fake homescreen will fool them for like 30 secs tops until they open literally any app and sees it’s either completely empty or that it doesn’t work.
What would that solve? It just drags out the procedure
The purpose of a duress code is plausible deniability.
There is an encryption product for Windows called VeraCrypt (aka TrueCrypt). You can create a hidden decoy volume inside an outer encrypted volume which has all your stuff in it. When mounted an observer cannot tell the difference between the hidden volume and the real volume since they are mounted the same way with different passcodes. You can put files in the decoy for plausibility but not the things you actually want to hide.
The same should be true of a duress code in a phone. It should be possible to put files, apps and stuff in the decoy that show activity e.g. email, pictures etc. Providing the other profile is wiped while this screen is showing then there is no immediate way of proving it was a duress code.
It would have to at least convince the border guard, but it should withstand forensic analysis too. So it might be necessary to do what VeraCrypt does.
Empty apps or no apps aren’t necessarily a sign of guilt, but they will look at you like you are because its not normal.
Companies often have travel laptops which are a clean install and no private corporate info exposed.