ESET researchers discovered 11 vulnerable UEFI shim bootloaders signed by Microsoft that allow attackers to bypass UEFI Secure Boot by exploiting decade-old vulnerabilities.
I’d argue this is actually a popular opinion. IMO secureboot has just become a way for Microsoft to leverage it’s position and keep a strangle hold on industries they have no business being in.
The whole kernel level anti-cheat on win11 bullshit in the gaming industry is a good example. Essentially locking games to its platform and willing to sacrifice security to do so at our expense.
This is especially true on computers where it is impossible to change the signing keys. Smartphones, game consoles, many laptops, some desktops, smart TVs, IoT devices, modern cars, etc.
Kind of. You can change the signing key for the operating system, but you cannot change the signing key of the primary bootloader, as that is baked into the SoC.
That’s moreso because it’s using an unofficial key, so the device manufacturer (Google in the case of Pixels) cannot verify the authenticity of the OS you’re running.
If you were able to replace that bootloader with a custom one, then you would be able to disable that message or just use a completely different bootloader like UBoot or EDK2 if it was ported, though.
Functionally, though, wouldn’t it be the same as replacing the computer’s SecureBoot bootloader, since it’s Microsoft (in the case of SecureBoot) that doesn’t like the unofficial key that Linux installs? Shouldn’t the user be allowed to add or remove any key they desire from the allow list of official keys (maybe have some sort of decentralized verification system, if they user decides they want to verify it)?
I’m more thinking out loud here, trying to understand.
The difference is that with ARM TrustZone, there is an efuse burned with the key that the manufacturer set in the SoC itself that checks the signature of the primary bootloader, which cannot be modified.
Standard computers do not have such a hardware-level key, so if you wanted to replace the bootloader with something like coreboot if it has been ported to your board, then you can. On smartphones, you do not have that option.
Same thing goes for even more locked down systems like game consoles.
You think that’s a safety boot you’ve got there? It’s anything but! It is clearly the bottommost part of a certain powered hazmat suit - why, it’s a Hazard Boot! You’ll need to ask one of the egg heads whether Secure Boot is a part of its boot sequence, though.
Poor Gordon Freeman, running around out there somewhere, with just one Hazard Boot. I guess you’ll find that his other leg is running with Insecure Foot, then.
And, how many people switch to something other than the default? Most W11 users are just going to go with whatever the computer says it’s doing without changing anything. They’re either ignorant of the options available, or scared of breaking something if they make a change.
What problem does it create? Its a good tech and we absolutely should be cryptographically verifying the boot process to ensure it hasnt been tampered with.
Unpopular opinion but I’m dying on this hill. Secure boot creates more problems than it solves.
I’d argue this is actually a popular opinion. IMO secureboot has just become a way for Microsoft to leverage it’s position and keep a strangle hold on industries they have no business being in.
The whole kernel level anti-cheat on win11 bullshit in the gaming industry is a good example. Essentially locking games to its platform and willing to sacrifice security to do so at our expense.
This is especially true on computers where it is impossible to change the signing keys. Smartphones, game consoles, many laptops, some desktops, smart TVs, IoT devices, modern cars, etc.
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Kind of. You can change the signing key for the operating system, but you cannot change the signing key of the primary bootloader, as that is baked into the SoC.
I’m assuming this is why it will forever “warn” me that my phone is running an “insecure” OS?
That’s moreso because it’s using an unofficial key, so the device manufacturer (Google in the case of Pixels) cannot verify the authenticity of the OS you’re running.
If you were able to replace that bootloader with a custom one, then you would be able to disable that message or just use a completely different bootloader like UBoot or EDK2 if it was ported, though.
Functionally, though, wouldn’t it be the same as replacing the computer’s SecureBoot bootloader, since it’s Microsoft (in the case of SecureBoot) that doesn’t like the unofficial key that Linux installs? Shouldn’t the user be allowed to add or remove any key they desire from the allow list of official keys (maybe have some sort of decentralized verification system, if they user decides they want to verify it)?
I’m more thinking out loud here, trying to understand.
The difference is that with ARM TrustZone, there is an efuse burned with the key that the manufacturer set in the SoC itself that checks the signature of the primary bootloader, which cannot be modified.
Standard computers do not have such a hardware-level key, so if you wanted to replace the bootloader with something like coreboot if it has been ported to your board, then you can. On smartphones, you do not have that option.
Same thing goes for even more locked down systems like game consoles.
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Only in tech circles, it says secure and that’s enough for most people.
Outside of tech circles most people think secure boot looks something like this
You think that’s a safety boot you’ve got there? It’s anything but! It is clearly the bottommost part of a certain powered hazmat suit - why, it’s a Hazard Boot! You’ll need to ask one of the egg heads whether Secure Boot is a part of its boot sequence, though.
Poor Gordon Freeman, running around out there somewhere, with just one Hazard Boot. I guess you’ll find that his other leg is running with Insecure Foot, then.
Fantastic 😂 ! Thanks for the laugh.
That’s like saying windows 11 doesn’t need tpm chips, an extremely popular opinion
That’s a very popular opinion.
Was it ever popular?
Popular is the wrong question, the correct question is, how many machines is this default on.
And, how many people switch to something other than the default? Most W11 users are just going to go with whatever the computer says it’s doing without changing anything. They’re either ignorant of the options available, or scared of breaking something if they make a change.
What problem does it create? Its a good tech and we absolutely should be cryptographically verifying the boot process to ensure it hasnt been tampered with.